


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DECISION—The spy paced the floor of Orly airport, debating with himself whether or not to remain in the West.

Our Man in the Kremlin

Spy's Choice: Home or Safety

(Eighth in a Series)

By Frank Gibney

Colonel Penkovsky arrived at Le Bourget Airport, near Paris, on Sept. 20, 1961. His British friend, Greville Wynne, met him at the airport.

Penkovsky obviously could not have informed Wynne of his exact arrival time without arousing suspicion among his superiors in Moscow. At the request of the British and American intelligence team, Wynne, still Penkovsky's safest contact, had flown to Paris and gone to the airport every day for two weeks, watching the arrivals on each flight from Moscow.

From the standpoint of western intelligence, his vigil was well-spent. The brilliant Soviet volunteer spy had brought a huge quantity of exposed film put with him—photographs of secret intelligence documents, technical processes, order of battle information on Soviet dispositions in

Germany, and—most important of all—more top-secret details of the Kremlin's missile production and deployment.

As usual, Penkovsky checked in promptly with the Paris "resident" of the Soviet military intelligence and went over details of the Soviet intelligence assignment given him in Moscow as well as his cover job of looking after the Soviet Exhibition in Paris.

Three days after his arrival, however, the colonel began the real business of his trip. Wynne drove him to one of the Seine River bridges, where he met the members of the British and American intelligence team who had worked with him in London.

Through the next month he continued his secret conferences with them at various "safe" apartments in the city. As before in London, Penkovsky gave them a vast store of military and political information, supplementing the documents he had photographed with

his own informed analyses of current Soviet plans and military preparations.

He also laid the groundwork for an even more widespread network of communications with Western agents in Moscow which would allow him to continue his secret communications with Washington and London with a minimum of risk.

Fresh Air

When he was not engaged with either set of intelligence officers, Penkovsky again turned tourist, with his British friend, Greville Wynne, acting as guide. The paintings at the Louvre and the night club extravaganzas at the Lido, Penkovsky viewed with apparently equal interest. Once again, he acted like a man who had suddenly been exposed to a draft of fresh air after long confinement in a closed place.

Without constant Soviet surveillance to worry about, occasionally he lost his normal caution. Once, when he

Continued



schev's missile and Berlin offensives was so important that they were concerned about his future personal security.

For days before his departure Oleg Penkovsky debated with himself as he walked the streets of Paris. He had pressing family considerations at home—a pregnant wife, a mother, a teenage daughter. Could he cut them from his life forever? And to leave the familiar world of Russia, much as he hated the Soviet regime, meant a cruel wrench. Yet everything in his immediate surroundings argued that he stay.

He almost did. The plane for Moscow was delayed by fog and the omen did not escape him. For hours he paced the floor of the waiting room at Orly Airport, virtually arguing out loud with himself, as Wynne patiently listened. He hesitated, literally at the customs barrier, but at the last minute he said goodbye to Wynne and marched back into a world from which he had long since emigrated in spirit.

Penkovsky explained his decision later in the Papers, when he wrote shortly after his return to Moscow: "I feel that for another year or two I must continue in the General Staff of the USSR, in order to reveal all the villainous plans and plottings of our common enemy, i.e. I consider myself as a soldier of the West, so my place during these troubled times is on the FRONT LINE. I must remain on this front line in order to be your eyes and ears, and my opportunities for this are great. God grant only that my modest efforts be useful in the fight for our high ideals for mankind."

The following excerpt from the Penkovsky Papers suggests how powerful some of Penkovsky's immediate efforts were. He discusses the extent of the Soviet intelligence network operating out of the Paris embassy. It is now clear that Penkovsky exposed most of the Soviet spy network in West-

in the same month when he was a temporary member of Soviet Military Intelligence in Paris.

By Oleg Penkovsky

During my trips to England and France during 1961, I was given the mission, just as other military intelligence officers, of collecting information of a military and scientific nature.

As I was in charge of the delegation, I did not participate in "active operational work," as we call it. It established contacts, made acquaintances, collected literature which would be of interest to Soviet intelligence.

In France and England people talked to me freely, invited me to their homes, restaurants and offices. I was astonished by this because at intelligence staff school in Moscow I was taught entirely different things about the French and British "secret police."

After spending some time in those two countries I saw how natural and unaffected the people behaved, as though there were no such thing as the secret police. Even our military intelligence officer in London, Shapovalov, loves England — "Mother England," as he calls it.

While I was in London, I asked about the Cosmonaut Yuri Gargarin's visit to England. Gargarin does not speak English, but he had some excellent translators. Everyone assigned to him was selected from our "neighbors," the secret po-

lice. Shapovalov told me that it was uncomfortable to see so many State Security police surrounding Gargarin.

While he was in London, he lived in House No. 13, on the second floor (Kensington Palace Gardens). People by the hundreds stood in the streets in order to see him, and one British girl waited 18 hours to catch a glimpse of him. When Gargarin was told about this, he said, "What a fool! It would have been better if she had shared my bed for a couple of hours." Here is the new historical personality for you.

Berlin Crisis?

During my second trip to London in July, 1961, there were a few representatives of the Central Committee CPSU in my delegation. They had a lengthy conference with Ambassador Soldatov. Later I was told by

ambassador Prokhorov and Shapovalov that they had brought money and special instructions for the British Communist Party.

Khrushchev had personally ordered Soldatov to meet with certain leaders of the British Communist Party in the expectation of obtaining information on the Berlin situation and on the probable reaction of the British government in case of a Berlin crisis.

Pavlov, Shapovalov and Milovidov also said that a directive had been received from the Central Committee and military intelligence to employ all agents and friendly contacts in England in order to collect information. The ambassador had a conference with the intelligence Residents and gave them instructions from the Center.

Shortly after this all the officers in the embassy took off in various directions all over England to gather the needed information. The entire force of operational, strategic, and political intelligence services was mobilized for this.

I cannot understand at all why the Communists are permitted to operate so freely in England and France. Why are they not shown who is boss? Where are the counterintelligence services of the Western countries? What are they doing?

Communist Contacts

Ananyev, our officer in Paris, told me that Soviet intelligence has very close working relations with Communists, especially those who work in the government, Army, and NATO. Ananyev and Prokhorov had both told me that it was very easy to carry on illegal operations in France, especially in Paris.

It is true that if we approach an ordinary Frenchman and he learns that he is speaking with Russians, he will immediately run and report the contact to the police. But French Communists, generally speaking, readily agree to work for us in any directions we want and what to do. They act as spotters and obtain military information.

According to Prokhorov, we could not work so well in France without Communist help. He actually made the statement that we bought France easily, and

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bought the harlot cheap"—those were the words he used.

Military intelligence has levied a requirement on all residencies, especially those in France, to obtain information on the new models of NATO weapons. They are to use all possible contacts, including all the representatives of the countries of the people's democracies, acquaintances and Communists.

There were many other requirements regarding the collection of information of various sorts, including approximately 20 to 25 items directly concerned with electronics, especially electronic technology as used by missile troops of the American and British armies. We were also directed to obtain information about certain kinds of small American missiles launched from aircraft, which create various forms of interference in the air and disrupt radar scanning.

All operational intelligence officers were assigned the task of visiting chemical enterprises in France, America and England in order to learn the process and ingredients of solid fuel for missiles.

Information was desired on heat-resisting steel; there seemed to be some reason to believe that the USA had done some very good work in this field. The GRU considers that the French have an excellent solid fuel for

missiles, and have made great progress in this direction.

I told the resident in Paris that I would be traveling through France and could select suitable sites for dead drops. The resident replied that they had all the dead drop sites needed. He told me not to waste my time on this.

The resident also said that it was very easy to arrange agent meetings in France, to transmit and receive materials, etc. He even indicated that dead drops were seldom used because it was simple to arrange direct meetings with agents. These are not set up very frequently, however, only when necessary.

At the embassies in Paris and London, Tass intercepts and prints all communications which do not find their way into the Soviet press. This is done for all the ambassadors, ministers, and deputy ministers. In Military Intelligence they are read by everyone down to and including the chief of a directorate. This is how they learn about everything that goes on in the world but does not get into their own press.

TUESDAY: Penkovsky returns to Moscow; the State Security police begin to watch him; he describes the Kremlin's plans for chemical and bacteriological warfare.

Condensed from the forthcoming book, "Penkovsky Papers," © 1965, Doubleday & Co., Inc.

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